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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

PLEWE ·CONSTRUCTION

C~0:\1-

P~\NY,

Plaintiff and _.·1 ppellant,
vs.

Case No. 9315

FRANI~J_llX

NATIONAL INSlJRANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and R·espondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
In this brief the appellant Plewe ·Construction Compan~~ \\·ill be referred to as ~'Plewe,'' the respondent
Franklin Xational Insurance Co1npany will be referred
to as ''Franklin," Cudahy Packing Company will be referred to as ~'Cudahy" and Fiberglas Engineering and
Supply Division of Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation "\\rill be referred to as ~'Fiberglas.''
Since appellant's Staternents of Facts includes a recital of material either not found in the record or not
relevant to this appeal, respondent submits the foll0"\\
Ing:
7
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STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS
Plewe was constructing an addition to the plant of
Cudahy in Xorth Salt Lake, l'"tah, \\"'hen, on January :27,
1956, a fire occurred, datnaging said addition.
On April 23, 1958, Cudahy filed suit again~t Ple\re
In the District ·Court of Salt Lake County, l ...tah; .Civil
No. 116,222. In Count I of its Coinplaint, Cudahy alleged
that Plewe violated the tenns of the construction contract
and that as a result of said breach of contract, Cudahy\.:
building was damaged, profit~ frotn its business were
lost and expenses and costs \vere incurred by reason of
the fire.
In Count II Cudahy alleged that the damaged preinises were under the exclusive control of Plewe and that
the fire would not have occurred in the absence of negligence.
On August 15, 1958, Ple\Ye filed its Ans\\~er to the
Complaint denying that the pre1ni~es \Yere in its possession immediately prior to the fire and alleging that other
contractors or subcontractor~ ''"·ere in possession and
control of portions of ~aid pre1ni ses.
On N overnhPr 1G, 1959, Cudahy dis1nissed ·Count I of
its (~o111plaint and Ple\ve confe~sed judg1nent upon Count
II. ,J udgtnent \Ya~ entered accordingly.
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3
1\fter satisf~·ing the judg1nent in favor of Cudahy,
PlP\\·p filed thP prP~ent suit against Franklin in the District Court of ~alt Lake County, (Ttah, Civil X o. 1:.2:~,709.
In its Cotnplaint against Franklin, l)le\ve alleged that
~,ranklin had issued a policy of insurance ,,-hich "Tas in
pffect on January ~7, 195(); that on February 2S, 1955,
Plewe entered into a contract \vith ·Cudahy for the <·onstruction of an addition to the Cudahy· plant at X orth
~alt Lake, r tah; that l)lewe com1nenced work under said
contract and continued perfor1nance of the obligations
thereunder up to January '27, 1956, at which time a fire
oeeurred on the pren1ises being constructed hy Ple\ve
pursuant to said contract and that said fire caused extensive damage to the premises under construction, which
da1nage become a claun asserted by Cudahy against
Plewe (R. 2).
In its . A. nswer, Franklin, a1nong other defenses, contended that the damaged premises "'"ere occupied by or
under the care, cu~tocly or control of Plewe; that Plewe
had confessed judgment upon Count 11 of the Complaint
of Cudahy and \vas, therefore, estopped, precluded and
barred fro1n asserting that said damaged premises were
not under it~ control and set up exclusion (f) of its poliey, providing in part:
'~This

policy does not apply ... to injury to
or destruetion of ( 1) property O\\-ned, occupied or
used h~· or rented to the insured, or ( 2) ... pro-
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perty in the care,
ed ... " (R. 10).

custod~·

or eontrol of the insur-

On April 26, 1960 a pretrial \vas held in this ea~P
before the Honorable Ste\\·art ~[. llanson at "·hich tin1e
the issues \\·ere discussed and eounsel for J>le\Ye "\\·as
granted leave to file an a1nencled eo1nplaint \vhich \va~
later filed but contained nothing 1naterial to this appeal.
Further pretrial \Yas set for ~Ia~· ~0, 1960 and the
ease set for trial on June 15, 1960. The order recited:
"It is svl~eifically understood and agreed by
and between the parties hereto that in the event
this procedure was follo\ved that the defendant
would not be barred fron1 1naking any motions or
taking any depositions or taking any other steps
for discovery purposes ~o long as the same did not
delay the trial of this action.~' ( R. 19).
On l\Iay -!, 1960, Franklin filed a ~lotion for SuinInary J udg1nent pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5G.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This n1otion w·as expres~}~· based upon the pleading~ and file in this action~
the pleadings and file in ·Case X o. 11G.:2:2:2 entitled
·Cudahy Packing L 0Blpany Ys. Ple\\·e l\n1struction Coinpan~·'' and the polic~· of in~urance referred to in Ple\\·e's
Co1nplaint (R. :2:2).
4

1

Notice of hearing upon ~aid Inotion \Ya~ attached fixIng Fri<la~·. 11 ay :20. 1~)()0~ the date tlH•retofore ~et for
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further pretrial proceedings. rr,he ~I otion and Notice
\Ve re :-;p rv( ~d on ~J a~T 3, 1960 ( R. 23) .
.;\ t the hearing upon Franklin ~s ~r otion for Summary
Judg1nent, the <'ourt recPived the insurance polie~· as an
Pxhibit (R. :2-l-). The ~lotion for Sunuuar~· J udg1nent \\·as
taken under advisernent and the ease continued for further pretrial on June 1, 19()0 ( R. :2()).
On l\lay 2G, 1960 the court entered Surnrnary Judgment against Ple\\Te ( R. 31, 32).
On July :22, 1960, Judge Hanson rendered a ~lenlo
randum Decision finding that Franklin had issued a liability policy insuring Ple\\'e against liability for damaged
property but that said policy did not apply to property
o\vned, occupied or used by or rented to Ple\ve or propert~· in the care, custody or control of Ple\\·e and that Ple\Ye
in the action brought by Cudahy had confessed judgment
and judgrnent had been duly entered upon such confession against Ple,ve under allegations that the damaged
prernise~ \\·ere under the exclusive control of Plewe.
The court noted that no affidavits, testimony or representations of counsel \\Tere offered or made contradicting said facts.
The court stated that it was of the opinion that the
prernises were under the control of Ple\Ye \\Tithin the
rneaning of the policy an<l further that Ple\ve \\·as estop-
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ped by the judg1uent in the Cudahy cast· fro1n den~Ting
that the darnaged pre1nises \\'ere under its control (R. ;j!)41).
After entr~T of Suunuary J udgn1ent, l)le\re filed a
Motion for N e\v Trial, although it had had no trial. Thj~
rnotion can1e on for hearing on July 11, 1960. .A.t that
time .Jir. Pratt, counsel for Plewe, n1ade c-ertain representations concerning 'vhat evidence could be produced
tending to impeach the judgment confessed. After thi~
statement had been made, counsel for Franklin 1nade certain objections to the procedure and pointed out that
\v·hat counsel for Ple,ve really 'vanted 'vas a reconsideration of the motion, but even at this tin1e had offered no
affidavits, depositions or testi1nony tending to generate
an issue of fact.
This appeal follo"red denial of Ple"Te ,s :\lotion for
New Trial.

STATE~lEXT

OF POINTS

_,Appellant,~

state1nent of point~ i~ 111o~t confu~ing to
respondent and rP~pondent has, therefore, adopted it~
O\\Tn for1n for diseus~ion of the points inYolYed in thi~
appeal as tlH\re is onl~· onP real i~~ue before the eourt.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING FRANKLIN'S MOTION FOR SUl\iMARY JUDGMENT.
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A. THE DAMAGED PREMISES WERE ·OCCUPIED
BY PLEWE OR WERE IN ITS CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL.
B. PLEWE IS ESTOPPED BY THE JUDGMENT IN
THE CUDAHY CASE FROM DENYIN.G THAT THE DAMAGED PREMISES WERE UNDER ITS CONTROL.
C.

DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS.

ARGUI\1ENT
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING FRANKLIN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A. THE DAMAGED PREMISES WERE OCCUPIED
BY PLEWE OR WERE IN ITS. CARE; CUSTODY OR CONTROL.

In its Corn plaint against Franklin, Plewe pleaded:
"3. That on or about February 28, 1955,
plaintiff entered into a contract with Cudahy
Packing Company for the construction of an addition to the Cudahy Plant at North Salt Lake,
lTtah; that the pla,intiff. com1nenced work under
the said contract and continued performance of
the obligations thereunder up to January 27, 1956,
at ''"·hich time a fire occurred on the premi·ses being constructed by the plaintiff, pursuant to said
contract; and that s.aid fire caused exfrnsive darnage to the premises under cunstr1tction, u·hich
damage becarne a claim asserted by Cudahy

against the plaintiff herein.'' ( R. 2)
( E1nphasis added.).
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Franklin's policy excluded:
'' ... injury to or destruction of ( 1) propert:·
owned, occupied or used by or rented to the insured, or ( 2) ... property in the care, custody or
control of the insured ... " (R. 10, Ex. 1).
In Black's Law Dictionary ( 3 Ed.), ""control" is defined as:
"Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, direct, govern, administer or oversee."
In Rose vs. LTnion Gas and Oil Co., (6 Cir., 1924)
297 F. 16, it is defined as follows:
"The \Yord ·control' does not in1port an absolute or even qualified ownership. On the contrary, it is s~Tnonomous \Yith 8Uperintendence,
management, or authority to direct, restrict, or
regulate."
1

In Volf vs. Ocean Accident & Guaranty ( orp .. (Calif.,
1958) 325 P.2d 987, it \\·as held that portions of a residence under construction by a con tractor "·ere in the
care, custody or control of the contractor "·ithin the
meaning of a polie:· provision excluding fron1 coverage
da1nage to such property.
In Hard1rare J!utual Cas. Co., v~. J!ason-JlooreTracy, Inc., (2 ('1ir., 1D52) 194 F.~d 17:1, the court held
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that thP ·'control'' ex(·lusion <'lausp required onl)· that
the insured hP in control of the propert)· injured and that
"·hether its use of the propert:· \Yas exelusive or in conth others ,,·as iunna terial.
junction

,,.i

Exa1nination of l>le\ve'~ Con1plaint reveals that
I)le\ve claiins that the damaged pr<:Inises \Yere under construction b)· it at the ti1ne of the fire ( R. 2).
The finding of the lo\vPr <'ourt, therefore, that
"The damaged pretnises ,,·ere under the control of Plewe within the Ba~aning of the exclusion
of the policy and that Franklin ,,·as, therefore,
under no obligation to defend Cudahy's claim
against Plewe or pay the judgrnent against Plewe

"
finds adequate support in the uncontroverted evidence
before the court at the hearing on the ~lotion for SumInary Judgment.
B. PLEWE IS ESTOPPED BY THE JUDGMENT IN
THE CUDAHY CASE FROM DENYING THAT THE DAMAGED PREMISES WERE UNDER ITS CONTROL.

The judgment entered against Ple\ve in the
case was:

C~udahy

''This matter having con1e on regularly
before the above-entitled court for trial on Monday, the 2nd day of X oven1ber, 1959, \vith the
Honorable Aldon J ...A_nderson. ,Judge thereof, presiding and the partie~ haYing appeared by and
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through their respective attorneys, and a jury
having been impaneled and the plaintiff thereupon
having moved to reduce the prayer of its Coinplaint and to dismiss the first ·Count of its Complaint and to seek recovery against the defendant
Plewe Construction Company on the second count
of its Complaint and solely on the basis of the
negligence of Ple\ve Construction Company and
no objection having been made to such motions,
and the court having considered and granted the
same, and the defendant Ple\Ye Construction Con1pany having then confessed judgment on the second count of plaintiff's Complaint in the amount
of $12,500 and having disn1issed its Third Party
Complaint \vith prejuidice,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered, adjudged
and decreed as follows:

1. That the first ea use of action stated in
the first count of plaintiff's Complaint should be,
and the same is here by dis1nissed "Ti th prejudice
and on the merits.
2.

That the plaintiff should have and it is
hereb~T granted judgment in the an1ount of $12,500
against Ple,,·e Construction Co1npany on the Second Count of Plaintiff's Complaint.
3. That the Third Party Co1nplaint filed by
defendant against Fiberglas Engineering and
Supply Division of 0\vens-Corning Fiberglas
Corporation ~hould be, and the sa1ne i~ hereby,
dismi~sed \Yith prejudieP and on the 1nerits~ and
that thP ero~~-clain1 filed by Fibergla~ Engineering and Supply Division of 0\\Ten~-·Corning Fiber-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
g-las Corporation again~t the plaintiff should be,
and thP ~~une i~ hereh~,, dis1nissed \vith prejudice
and on the merits."
In Count ll of
was alleged :

(;udah~·,s

Coin plaint against l)le\\·e it

~~At

the aforesaid tiuH) and prior thereto, the
work on said addition and the premise~ thereabout
were under the exclusive eontrol of the defendant;
the said fire would not have occurred in the absence of negligence as aforesaid."
In addition to finding that the~ da1naged pre1nises
\Vere under the control of Plewe the Court found also
that Ple,ve was estopped by the judgment in the Cudahy
case from denying that the damaged premises \\·ere under
its con~rol. . Th_e general rule has been stated as follows:
'~The

judgment against insured under a liability policy in the prior action is conclusive
against hi1n as to facts therein established, and it
has been held, that where there \Yas a general verdict for plaintiff in such action, it may be assun1ed
for the purpose of an action on the policy that
every issuP litigated in the for1ner action \Yas
decided against insured'~ right to recover against
in~urer "There it establishes that the injury was
caused in a 1nanner eon~tituting a breach of \Yarranty on the part of insured or that the injury was
one not covered h~· the polie:r ... " -l-G C..T.R·. 260
(Insurance, RPetion 1251).
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Numerous cases so holding are collected in the annotation found in 123 A.L.R. at page 708 entitled "'JudgInent in action by third person against insured as res
judicata in favor of indemnity or liability insurer which
was not a nominal party." In its Brief, Ple"\\Te does not
deny this to be the rule .
.As the lower court correctly found, this rule applies
to judgments on confession as well as to judgments rendered after full trial (50 ·C.J.S. 160 (Judgments, Section
3705) ), a point also not attacked by Plewe in its Brief.

By its confession of judgment in the suit brought
by Cudahy Packing Company, Plewe admitted all of the
material allegation of the Con1plaint against it. Under
the second cause of action one of the material allegations
was that the premises were under the exclusive control of
Plewe. Plewe by one of the n1ost solemn acts kno\vn to
the law confessed judgment under this second cause of
action and cannot at this time, therefore, take a different position with respect to that allegation.
C.

DISCUSSION OF PLEWE'S CONTENTIONS.

In its Brief, Plewe 1nakes five principal contentions.
These will be discussed in order.
1. Respondent Has
Judgment.

~To

Standi up to Rely

lipo1~

Said

Contrary to the assertions of PI ewe, Franklin is not
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repudiating the polic~· but rather, is specifically relying
upon the Pxelnsion contained in the polity relative to propPrty in the pos~Pssion of or \\'ithin the care, eustody or
eon trol of Plewe.
The decision of the lo\\·er court was that the claim
asserted against Ple\\'(} \\'as excluded from the c-overage
of the policy. The decision of the court -in no \vay rests
upon the failure of Plewe to give pro1npt notice of the
accident or upon the so called Hno action" clause. Therefore, the decisions of Kershaw vs. ill aryland Ca:·nta lt_y
Conlpauy, (Calif., 1959) 342 P. 2d 72 and Grant vs. Sun
Indentnity, (Calif., 1938) 80 P.2d 996, have absolutely no
application to this case. Geddes & Snzith, Inc. l;s. St.
Paul-Jllercury Indemnity Conzpany, (Calif., 1959) 334
P.2d 881, does not deal \vith the subject for \\·hich it is
cited by Plewe.
2. The Judgn~ent Is Based Upon Neglig·ence and
;.Vat l rpon CoJI t rol of the Premises or Control of the
Da nznged Property.

The an~\\·er to this contention i~ found in Cudahy's
co1nplaint against Plewe \Yherein it is alleged:
HAt the aforesaid time and prior thereto,

the \vork on said addition and the prenzises ther·eabouts u·ere under the exclusive control of the
defendant; the said fire \vould not have occurred
in thP absence of negligence as aforesaid." .(Emphasis added.).
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However, if this were not sufficient, Ple\ve n1akes
the sarne elairn in its Cornplaint against Franklin in this
language:
'' ... a fire occurred on the prernirnes being
constructed by the plaintiff, pursuant to said contract; and that said fire caused extensive danzage
to the prentises under construction, \\Thich danlages became a claim asserted by Cudahy against
the plaintiff herein." (R. 2). (Emphasis added.).
3. The Judgment Does nTot Fall 1Vithin the Policy
Exclusion.

By its confession of judgment and the entry of
judgment thereon, Plewe adrnits that the prernises were
under its exclusive control. The policy does not apply
to property o\vned, occupied or used by or rented to
Plewe or property in the care, eustody or control of
Plewe.
At the time of the hearing upon the :\lotion for
Summary Judgment, PlP\\·e rnade no offer by affidavit
or other\\rise of any evidence tending to controvert the
effect of its judicial adrnission. Indeed, even at the hearing upon the ~lotion for X l\\\T Trial, no affidaYits or
other adrnissable Pvidenee \\·a~ offered. It is \vell settled
that the uns\Yorn ~taternents of coun~el do not generate
issuP~ of fact. lJujJ!er ( ...,·. rates, 10 lTtah 20. 231~ 351 P.
2d 624 (1960).
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-+. The J ll dg ntent Is 1Y ot Co uclu :i i 0 ely B i1td iup U pan
Plcwe in This Case.

The

dPei~ions

rited by Ple\\·e arl} c-learly not in point.

Ln the case of Bailey 1l!otor Co. vs. 1.Vorthu;est Casualty, ( \V ashington, 1935) -!9 P. ~d 911, cited by appellant, the finding relied upon h~· the insurer \vas not
i1nplicit in the judgrnent and, instead of adrnitting the
fact, the insured denied· it throughout the trial.
In Woodland vs. P.acific lndenutity Curnpany, (Calif.,
1937) 72 I>. ~d 256, eited by appellant, the court pointed
out that the issue involved in the second action \\~as ~'not
1naterial in the other action.''
J(ershazc vs. 1lfaryland Ua:iualty, (Calif., 1959) :)-t:2
P. 2d. 7:2, does not involve the doctrine of res judieata .

. Although Plewe quotes frorn the annotation found
at 1:23 A.L.R. 712, the quotation is of exceptions to the
rule. The general rule itself as therein set forth is:
"' ... a judgment in action b~~ a third person
against one insured under a liability or indemnity
policy 1nay be invoked as conclusive in its favor
by the insurer in a subsequent action again~t it,
if the issue decided in such prior action was material to the decision thereof and is identical with
the issue clairned in the later action to have been
adjudicated, even though the insurer \Va~ not a
nominal party to the first suit."
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5. The Judgment lias No Reference to tlze Dan1aged
Property.

This is, indeed, a startling contention in view of the
allegations of Ple\Ye's Complaint in this case that the
damage to the pre1nises under eonstruction ·· ... beca1ne
a claim asserted by Cudahy against . . . " Ple\ve.
CONCLUSIOX
It is well settled that the duty of an insurer with
respect to the defense of a clain1 is n1easured by the
allegations of the ·Co1nplaint against the insured. Lee
v.s. Aetna Casualty and S·urety Co.,· (2 Cir., 1949) 178 F.
2d 750; Hardware Jllutual Cas. C'o. 1_:s. J.lfason-MooreTracy, Inc., supra. If an insurance co1npany cannot rely
upon the truth of such allegations after the in~ured has
admitted their truth by judicial confes~ion, then an insurance co1npany can never know w·hether it does or does
not have a duty to defend the insured.
Respectfully sub1nitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
&. CHRISTENSEN,

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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